a payoff vector where each player is paid an amount which corresponds to the value of his resources, according to the given price vector. We call payoff vectors generated in this form dual payoffs. In terms of market games dual payoffs correspond to competitive payoffs. It turns out that the set of dual payoffs is always contained within the core of a given LP-game but the two sets need not be identical. However, if the set of players is refined (or equivalently, duplicated) many times, the cores of the refined games converge in a certain sense to the set of dual payoffs. This result follows from a well-known theorem of Debreu and Scarf [3] which states the equivalence of the core and the set of competitive payoffs for market games. However, for LP-games the proof is especially easy [7] . Billera and Raanan [2] considered games with a continuum of players and proved that for such games the core and the set of dual payoffs coincide in accordance with the equivalence theorem of Aumann and Shapley [1] for market games with a continuum of traders.
Owen [7] has noticed a property which is peculiar to LP-games which market games in general do not possess. He has shown that if there exists a unique optimal dual solution, then the coincidence of the dual set and the core occurs after a finite number of replications. Rosenmiiller [8] studied the fineness of the refinement required to achieve this coincidence. We study the finite convergence property in more detail in ?3. Theorem 2 in this section provides a necessary and sufficient condition for finite convergence in LP-games. Using corollaries of this theorem we can conclude that such convergence occurs if the set of dual payoffs is a singleton (even if the set of dual optimal solutions is not). Finite convergence is also guaranteed if the underlying LP-problem has rational data or if there are only two players in the original game. In ?4 we examine the conditions under which the core and dual set coincide even without replication. This phenomenon actually occurs in most of the special instants of LP-games which were considered in the literature ( F(t) = maximum cy P(t): subject to Ay < Bt where F(t) = -oo if P(t) is infeasible. It is well known that F is piecewise linear, concave and homogeneous of degree one on Rn. Let P = {P(t) t E Rn}. We call a system of linear programs of this type a Linear Programming System (LP-system). We assume in the sequel that for each coalition S the linear program P(ts) is feasible and bounded so that the optimal objective function values for the various coalitions are finite. Under these conditions the function F is finite over the entire nonnegative orthant R n+ . Consider the game Vp generated by the system P via the relation Vp(S) = F(tS). Thus, Vp(S) is the value of outputs which can be generated using the resources of coalition S only. We refer to games which arise in this fashion as Linear Programming
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Games (LP-games).
In cases where the LP-system associated with a given game is clear from the context, we suppress the subscript P and refer to the game simply as V. This convention is also used for all other constructs which are defined with respect to a given LP-system P.
The Consider the vector x = uB. The n dimensional vector x can be considered as a payoff vector which endows each player the value of his resources vector according to the price vector u. We call a vector x obtained in this way, a dual payoff vector, and denote by Dp the set of all dual payoff vectors, i.e., Dp = {x E R l x = uB for some dual optimal vector u for P(e)}.
It can easily be shown that Dp is the superdifferential of F at e, namely it contains all points x for which xe = F(e) and xt > F(t) for every t E R". In particular, for each S C N and x E Dp, xts > F(ts) = V(S) which shows that Dp C Cp for every LP-game and the latter set is therefore not empty.
There are several classes of linear programming systems which yield games with D = Cp. However, this is not the case in general. To illuminate the relation between these sets it is instructive to observe their behavior when the players are split (or equivalently replicated).
Let P be a given LP-system. The r-refinement of P, denoted pr, is obtained by splitting each original player (column of B) into r identical players each receiving b j/r as his initial endowment. We call the set of r identical players which replaces one original player a suit. Let Vp, be the LP-game generated by the system p r. It is well known that members of the same suit are equally treated in the core, i.e., they are always paid the same by core allocations. Therefore, the payment that a coalition S in Vpr gets in a core allocation is determined by its profile, i.e., by the number of players from each suit it contains. More precisely, let Gr be the grid of side 1/r in the unit cube of R n, i.e., Gr= {x E R nxi = ' qi an integer, 0 < qi < r, i = 1., .n With each coalition S in Vp, we associate a point ts = (ql/r, . . ., qn/r) in Gr where qi is the number of players from the ith suit in S.
Clearly, because of the equal treatment property each allocation in the core of Vpr is uniquely determined by the amount allocated to each suit and therefore this core can be described by a point in R" (rather than R nxr). Explicitly, define the r-refinement core, Cr by: Assume that Ul=i Tr(u') contains a neighborhood of e. Let x E Cr, i.e., xe = F(e) and xt > F(t) for every t E G . We have to show that xt > F(t) for every t E R". Since F is homogeneous and concave, it is enough to show that this inequality holds for the neighborhood of e, which is contained in Ul=I Tr(u ). Let to be a point in this neighborhood. Then by our assumption, to E Tr(u1) for some index i, 1 < i > 1. Hence
F(to) = u'to. But since xt > F(t) = u't for each t E Gr n Tr(u'), and since Gr n Tr(u') (conically) span Tr(ui) it follows that xto > F(to).
Conversely, assume that U.=l Tr(ui) does not contain a neighborhood of e. Since each one of these cones is a polyhedral cone, there exists a direction vector z E R" such that for each positive a, e + az X U'=l Tr(Ui). Let T(ui) = {t E R+ ut = F(t)}. Clearly, T(ui) is a convex cone which contains e for each i-= 1,..., 1. Moreover, since F is piecewise linear and finite in a neighborhood of e, we get that U'= T(u') contains a neighborhood of e. Furthermore, Tr(u1) C T(u1) for i = 1, . . . , 1. Let a be a small enough positive number so that t = e + az belongs to Ui=l T(u'). In particular t E T(uJ) for some 1 < j < 1. Obviously, t Tr(uI). Note that the intersection of Tr(U J) with the convex cone generated by t and e contains only the ray generated by e. We can therefore separate these two cones by a hyperplane which passes necessarily through the points 0 and e. Let ht = 0 be the equation defining this hyperplane with ht < 0, and ht > 0 for every t E Tr(Ui). We can normalize h in such a way that ht > F(t) -u t for each t in the finite set Gr n Tr(u ) (note that the right side is strictly negative for t in this set).
Consider now the payoff vector u J + h. We claim that this vector belongs to Cr but not to D. To check the first assertion note that (uJ + h)t > u t = F(t) for each t E Tr(u J). Furthermore, for each t E Gr n Tr(u J) it holds that (uj + h)t > uJt + F(t) -uJt = F(t);
and finally at the point e, (u + h)e =u je = F(e). On the other hand, to see that uj + h (4 D we note that (uj + h)t PROOF. By Theorem 1 of [10] it follows that the core C coincides with Dp, the set of dual payoff vectors defined by P. (Dp is actually the set of dual optimal solutions for P(e).) But Dp and Dp are the superdifferentials of F and F respectively, at e. Since
